Many empirical researches on timeliness of earnings announcements present the evidence for "good news early, bad news late". This paper goes further to divide an individual firm's news contents into two aspects: unexpected earnings related to the prior year (news A) and unexpected earnings related to the industry-wide medium earnings (news B), and prove in theory that they play different roles in determining the announcement dates under the assumptions that shareholders are reference dependent, loss averse, and with diminishing sensitivity, as the prospect theory describes, and managers attempt to maximize shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value. We find that similar to pervious literatures, news A is negatively correlated with reporting lag, but what distinguishes this research from them is that we continue to find that it is news B that provides underlying motivation for managers to advance or delay earnings announcement dates, and the probability of delaying announcement is increasing with the difference between news B and news A.
Introduction
"Good news early, bad news late" seems to be a rule for firms who are obliged to reveal information to the public and is evidenced by a great many literatures on timeliness of firms' earnings announcement, such as Givoly and Palmon (1982) , Lawrence (1983) , Begley and Fischer (1998) Anecdotal evidence shows that managers and shareholders are not only concerned with a firm's unexpected earnings compared to the prior year but also care about whether the firm's profitability out-performs or under-performs its rivals in the same industry, which implies that the news content of the earnings announcement can be decomposed into two aspects: unexpected earnings related to the prior year (news A) and unexpected earnings related to industry-wide medium earnings this year (news B). For example, consider a firm who earns $0.5 per dollar this year and outperform last year by $0.2 per dollar, will shareholders of the firm consider this news as good news? The answer of course is Yes if shareholders do not care about news B. However, when the shareholders realize that the industry-wide medium earnings level is $0.8 per dollar, the answer may be No, and the "good news" may turn into bad news.
Although it seems to be a conventional wisdom that whether earnings announcement contains good news or bad news depends on the shareholders' perceptions on both news A and news B, few studies have ever separately considered how news A and news B, especially news B, influence the mangers' choice on reporting lag, which is exactly what this paper does. Intuitionally, when earnings are announced, news A is immediately revealed and absorbed by shareholders while news B might not be revealed because the industry-wide medium earnings level might be still unknown at that time and shareholders might gradually learn it as time goes and more announcements have been made in the industry. Thus, if managers attempt to influence the financial market assessment of the firm's value, they may choose to advance announcements if they expect that the evaluation by shareholders on the firm's value based only on news A will be greater than the evaluation based on both news A and news B, which implies that managers will report earlier when they believe that compared to news A, news B is the worse news, or they may choose to delay announcement if they think that the evaluation by shareholders on firm's value based on both news A and news B will be greater than the evaluation based only on news A, which implies that managers will postpone reporting when they believe that news B is the better news when compared to news A.
How news B influences the firm's reporting lag is worth studying. Firstly, unlike news A which is revealed simultaneously with the earnings announcement, by changing the reporting lag, managers could determine whether news B is revealed or not from the earnings announcement. Thus, the study on news B' s impact on reporting lag will give us an opportunity to learn if managers indeed manipulate their reporting lag in order to maximize the shareholders' assessment on the firm' value. Secondly, if the intuition mentioned above is true, that is, managers tend to advance announcement when they think news B is the worse news when compared to news A and prefer to delay announcement when they believe new B is the better news when compared to news A, news B is the information that seems to deviate the rule of "good news early, bad news late", and it is interesting to see if this phenomenon really exists.
Our paper is built on the assumption that advancing or delaying reporting lag is motivated by managers' attempt to influence shareholders' evaluation, or perceptions on the firm's value. In classical economic and finance theory, the shareholders are assumed to maximize their expected utility and they are risk averse. In a famous paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , they show that the actual behavior of individuals systematically and consistently violates these assumptions. They present their framework as prospect theory and in which the outcomes of the choices are evaluated by a value function. The value function has three essential characteristics. Reference dependence: the carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference point. Loss aversion: the function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain; looses loom larger than the corresponding gains. Diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses decrease with size. Three properties give rise to an asymmetric S-shaped value function, concave above the reference point and convex below it. In our paper, we assume shareholders behave as prospect theory describes 1 . When they evaluate a firm's value, shareholders have two reference points, earnings in the prior year and the industry-wide medium earnings level,
and by comparing the actual earnings with the two reference points respectively, shareholders get news A and news B. If the industry-wide medium earnings level is still unknown when the firm's earnings is announced, the number of the reference point of the shareholders reduces to only one, and what they can get is only news A.
The paper contributes to the existing literatures in this field in two aspects: firstly, we decompose the news content into two aspects, and see separately how they influence the firm's reporting lag. We find that firms with good news A tend to advance announcement and firms with bad news A tend to delay announcement, which is similar to the conclusion of previous literatures. Aside from them, we go further to find that the announcement pattern of firms varies with the managers' belief on news B. Managers will have more motivation to advance the earnings announcement or will advance announcement dates to some great extent if they believe that news B is worse news than news A, and if managers believe that news B is better news than news A, they will have more motivation to delay the earnings announcement dates or will delay announcement dates to some great extent.
Therefore, we find that news A and news B do play different roles in the variation of reporting lag. Secondly, we provide another theoretical explanation about why managers change their firm's earnings announcement lag. In previous studies, As Ku Ismail and
Chandler (2003) summarized, several reasons have been advanced in the literature as to why firms with good news report promptly than those with bad news. Givoly and Palmon(1982) argued that it is the manager's natural desire to defer any repercussions from shareholders, and managers wish to continue and complete recent negotiations and contracts in the best possible light. Dye and Sridhar (1995) stated that because a company with good news will experience a rise in market values of both its outstanding equity shares and management (Watts and Zimmerman,1986) , it is reasonable to expect managers of a successful company to report its good news to the public on a timely basis. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argued that by delaying the bad news, management is giving its shareholders a silent signal and the opportunity to divest themselves of the firm's share before the information reaches the market, while announcing good news early will ensure that it is not preempted by other sources. Different from them, we argue that it is the disparity between shareholders' valuations of gains and losses that that motivate the managers to manipulate the reporting lag. In our model, we assume that managers try to maximize shareholders evaluations on firms, and for shareholders, the losses from bad news loom larger than the corresponding gains from good news. For instance, for firms with good news A, shareholders have a positive value on firms, and based on the value on news A, better news B will increase shareholders' value, while corresponding worse news B will sharply decrease shareholders' value to some great extent according to S-shaped value function of the shareholders, thus managers who only knows the possibility on news B ex ante prefer advancing earnings announcement to avoid news B revealed unless they believe that the probability that news B is better than news A is big enough to increase the expected shareholders' value. Inversely, for firms with bad news A, shareholders have a negative value on firms, and based on the value on news A, better news B will sharply increase shareholders' value, while corresponding worse news B will decrease shareholders' value to some relative small extent, thus managers tend to delay earnings announcement to let news B revealed even if they think that the probability that news B is better than news A is small. Therefore, what distinguishes our paper from previous literatures is that we find that resulting from the shareholders' value function as prospect theory describes, firms tends to advance earnings announcement because managers believe that delaying announcement until news B is revealed may decrease shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value, and firms prefer postponing their earnings announcement for managers think that delaying until news B is disclosed may increase the shareholder's evaluation on the firm's value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and derives two observations from the informal analysis. Section 3 provides formal analysis on the model. Section 4 provides empirical evidence of our theoretical conclusions from listed Chinese firms. Section 5 contains conclusion comments. We consider an individual firm's choice of earnings announcement dates at t=0, and we divide the reporting time into two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1 from t=0 to t=1, it is assumed that few firms in the industry have reported their earnings, and in period 2 from t=1 to t=2, more firms in the industry are assumed to have their earnings reported.
Managers make a choice to report the earnings either in period 1 or in period 2. If the earnings are reported in period 1, the announcement only reveals news A to shareholders, then shareholders evaluate the firm's value only based on news A, and get a value as denoted by U(A). If the earnings are reported in period 2, besides news A, news B is also revealed from the earnings announcement and the shareholders can further assess the firm's earnings performance in the industry, hence they can evaluate the firm's profitability depending on both news A and B, and obtain a value as denoted by U (B w 
where 1>α >0，and k >1. In our model, we assume that shareholders have two reference points when they evaluate a firm's value: the firm's earnings in the prior year and the industry-wide medium earnings this year, and if the industry-wide medium earnings level is still unknown when the firm's earnings is announced, the number of the reference point of the shareholders reduces to one, and what shareholders can get is only news A from earnings announcement. Without the knowledge of B, shareholders perceive A>0 as good news and A<0 as bad news, thus shareholders get a value as U(A).
It is obvious that when B + <A, EU(B w ) is always less than U(A), and the optimal choice of managers is to announce earnings in period 1 since waiting until period 2 will just decrease the shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value. Correspondingly, EU(B w ) is always more
>A, and managers will prefer to report earnings in period 2 since B is no doubt better than A, and the shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value must be increased.
Thus, in the following of the paper, we concentrate on discussing the case when A is between B − and B + .
According to the sign of A, firms are divided into two types, one is earnings increased related to the prior year, i.e., A>0 and the other is earnings decreased related to the prior year, i.e., A<0. Then, based on the relation between A and B*, firms are re-divided into the other two types, i.e., B*>A, and B*< A. Thus, we get four types of firms as table 1 shows. Table 1 is inserted here.
As we have argued above, whether firms advancing or delaying earnings announcement is depending on managers' comparison between U(A) and EU(B w ), and as an informal analysis, we illustrate in figures for each type of firm how managers choose the announcement dates to maximize the shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value given shareholders' value function and managers' belief on B*. In the next section, we will provide formal analysis.
In the figures, shareholders' value function is S-shaped as the prospect theory describes, which indicates that shareholders are risk-aversive when they face gains and are risk seeking when they face loss. The negative domain is steeper than the positive domain, which indicates that loss looms larger than the corresponding gains. Here, shareholders are assumed to perceive good news as gains and bad news as loss, and they evaluate the firm according to the value they obtain from the news. As we have assumed, managers do not In figure 1 , it is obvious that the dashed parts dominate the whole oblique line, which implies that type 1 firms are more likely to advance earnings announcement. As figure 1 illustrates, when A is good news and managers believe that the median of B, denoted by B * , is worse news than news A, managers will probably advance their earnings announcement even if they think that B + is more likely to happen than B − . We will prove in section 3 that it is shareholders' loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity that motivates managers to advance their announcements.
Figure 2 A>0, B*>A is inserted here
In figure 2 , we find that it is hard to tell whether type 2 firms will advance their earnings announcements or will delay their earnings announcement because the dashed parts and the solid parts of the oblique line seem to be of equal length. In figure 3 , similar to figure 2, we find that it is hard to tell whether type 3 firms will advance their earnings announcements or will delay their earnings announcement because the dashed parts and the solid parts of the oblique line seem to be of equal length. . We will prove in section 3 that it is shareholders' loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity that motivates managers to delay their announcements.
For clarity, we give a summary on the announcement pattern of the four types of firms in In the following section, we provide formal analysis on observation 1 and 2.
Formal analysis
As section 2 mentioned, managers will compare EU(B w ) and U(A) when they make a decision on when to announce the firm's earnings announcement. If EU(B w )>U(A), it is optimal for firms to delay earnings announcement because managers believe that waiting until news B is revealed from the earnings announcement will increase the shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value by increasing shareholders' value from getting news B. In contrast, if EU(B w )<U(A), managers will optimally advance their earnings announcement since managers think that waiting until B is revealed from the earnings announcement will only decrease the shareholders' assessment on the firm's value. In this section, we provide formal proof to our observations in section 2.
At t=0, managers estimate about B − and B + , and their probabilities, respectively p and 1−p.
We define p* as the critical probability which lets EU(B w )= U(A). If managers believe that the actual p is equal to p*, there will be no difference for firms to advance or delay earnings announcement because the news B will not decrease or increase shareholders'
value, thus will not change shareholders' evaluation on the firm's value.
We use V(p) to denote the difference between EU(B w ) and U(A) as follows:
, and V(p) could be simplified as below: , and it is easy to find that V(p) is decreasing in p. As we have defined before, p* is the critical probability which lets EU(B w )= U(A), then V(p*) is equal to 0 and p* can be given by:
When managers think that p is less than p*, i.e., p∈[0, p*], then EU(B w ) > U(A), and the optimal choice is to postpone earnings announcement, and therefore p*, the length of the delay-announcement range, measures the probability of firms to delay announcement.
However, if managers think that p is larger than p*, i.e., p∈[p*, 1], then the firm should advance the earnings announcement for EU(B w )<U(A) and therefore 1−p*, the length of advance-announcement range, measures the probability of firms to advance announcement.
If the delay-announcement range is more narrow than the advance-announcement range, that is, p*<1−p*, and p*<0.5, firms will probably choose to announce their earnings earlier and vice versa. In section 2, we have shown informally in figures 1 and 4 that for type 1 firms, p* is less than 0.5 and more firms will choose to advance earnings announcement while for type 4 firms, p* is larger than 0.5 and firms will probably delay announcement dates. By the definition of p*, it can be inferred that the less p* is, firms will probably report their earnings earlier, and the greater p* is, firms tend to delay earnings announcement. Here we provide proposition 1 and 2 to verify the observation 1 and proposition 3 to verify the observation 2. the critical probability, p*, is always greater than 0.5.
The proof of proposition 2 is in the appendix.
Proposition 2 indicates that the probability range for announcing earnings in period 1 is more narrow than the range for postponing reporting to period 2, therefore type 4 firms are more likely to postpone their announcements.
For type 2 and type 3 firms, we are not sure whether x 1 is bigger than x 2 or not, therefore we are not sure whether p* is greater than 0.5 or not. In this way, we identify that these two types of firms have no strong tendencies, and whether they would advance the earnings announcement, or would postpone the earnings announcement depending on managers' beliefs on p.
By far, we have proved formally the observation 1 in section 2 that firms will probably advance the earnings announcement if their earnings is increased related to the prior year,
i.e., A>0, and will probably delay the earnings announcement if the earnings is decreased related to the prior year, i.e., A<0. In the following, we give proposition 3 to verify the observation 2.
Proposition 3
Given A and C, the critical probability, p*, is increasing in B*− A.
The proof of proposition 3 is in the appendix. 
Hypotheses and methodology
The variables used in our empirical test are listed in table 3. Table 3 is inserted here
The primary hypothesis that we test is the relation between the unexpected reporting lag and unexpected earnings as predicted by the good news early bad news late relation. By unexpected reporting lag, we mean the difference between the reporting lag for the fiscal year and the expected reporting lag, where the expected one is proxied by the reporting lag in the prior year, and the reporting lag is defined as the number of days from the end of the fiscal year to the actual announcement date in the next year markets, such as U.S. market, find evidences which is consistent with this hypothesis. In our paper, H1 indicates that news A is negatively related to the reporting lag, which is theoretically deduced from observation 1 in section 2 and proposition 1 and 2 in section 3.
As we have emphasized in this paper, not only news A, but also news B has impact on the firm's announcement pattern. According to observation 2 and proposition 3, we go further to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Firms tend to delay the reporting date if ΔNEWS>0, and tend to advance the reporting date if ΔNEWS<0.
Hypothesis 2b: The probability of delaying the earnings announcement is increasing with ΔNEWS.
The implication of hypothesis 2a and 2b is that firms tend to delay reporting earnings waiting for news B to be better than news A, and prefer advancing reporting earnings if they believe that waiting only brings worse news B than news A. The three propositions in section 3 will be empirically proved if both hypothesis 1 and 2 are true.
Results
Before testing our hypothesis, in table 4 some basic descriptive statistics for type [1] [2] [3] [4] firms' choice of announcement dates are reported. Table 4 is inserted here 
Test of hypothesis 1
In 
Test of hypothesis 2a
In table 6, the sample is put into 10 portfolios based on the size of ΔNEWS, from the lowest ΔNEWS group to the highest ΔNEWS group. ΔNEWS is equal to B minus A, where B is measured by the firm's adjusted EPS less the industrial median adjusted EPS.
ΔNEWS>0 means that news B is better news when compared to news A, and ΔNEWS>0
means that news B is worse news when compared to news A. We find that for the firms belonging to P1 with the most negative ΔNEWS, whose average is -0.12, will significantly delay their earnings announcement by 7.77 days. We also find that the firms belonged to P10 with the most positive news A, whose average is 0.03, will significantly advance their earnings announcement by 2.49 days. In the last two columns of We put the prediction group into regression and the result is reported in table 7. Table 7 is inserted here
In table 7 , we find that the probability of delaying announcement dates is decreasing in news A and the change of firm size, ΔLOG (MV), but is increasing in ΔNEWS, which is exactly consistent to H2b and the proposition 3 in section 3 has been supported perfectly empirically. It is worth noting that news B, contrary to news A, giveS the motivation for managers to deviate the rule of good news early bad news late, and it is neglected by previous literatures.
Then we use the test group to testify the prediction power of the logistic model. The method is to put regression coefficients from a 0 to a 3 into the estimation equation and then compute P for each sample. We expect that firms with P≥0.5 would delay their earnings announcement, and firms would advance the announcement if P<0.5. The prediction result 4 We have done Spearman correlation analysis on the 3 explanatory variables before estimating the logistic model, and the absolute value of correlation coefficient between any two variables is less than 0.5 but significantly different from zero at 0.01 level. Specifically, the correlation coefficient between A and ΔNEWS is -0.168.
is depicted in table 8. Table 8 is inserted here Table 8 shows that the proportion of total correct prediction approaches 58%, and for firms who delay announcements, the proportion of correct prediction is close to 70%. Thus, we
can conclude that our model succeeds to predict delay of firms' announcement dates.
Whereas, the model fails to predict firms' advancing reports, which may result from managers' conservatism when they expect news B, that is, they tend to underestimate news B than it really is, which implies that some firms should delay their earnings announcement but advance it. Another possible reason may lies in that managers believe that the shareholders may view the delay of announcement as the signal of bad news, therefore they will avoid delaying reports even if they believe that delay will bring better news B to shareholders.
In this section, we have found strong empirical evidence by testing hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b to support the propositions 1-3 in our theoretical model, and we conclude that firms tends to advance earnings announcement because managers believe that delaying announcement until news B is revealed may decrease shareholders' evaluation on firm's value, and firms prefer to postpone their earnings announcement because managers think that delaying until news B is revealed may increase the shareholder's evaluation of them.
Conclusion
In this paper, we try to answer one question: how does news revealed from the earnings announcement impact on the firm's announcement pattern, and why? We divide news contents into two aspects, news A (unexpected earnings related to the prior year) and news B (unexpected earnings related to the industry-wide medium earnings), and the role news B plays in determining the firm's announcement dates is what we are really interested in because news B is the news revealing whether from the earnings announcement is determined by managers through manipulating the announcement dates. To the authors' knowledge, few literatures on the timeliness of earnings announcement have taken news B into account but as we have showed, studying on news B gives us an opportunity to learn if managers indeed manipulate their reporting lag in order to maximize the shareholders' assessment on the firm's value. In our model, we assume shareholders behave as prospect theory describes, that is, they are reference dependent, loss averse and with diminishing sensitivity, and we find that it is just the disparity between the shareholders' valuations of gains and losses that motivate managers to manipulate the reporting lag. Our main conclusion is that firms show different announcement pattern according to managers' belief on news B: firms tends to advance earnings announcement because managers believe that delaying announcement until news B is revealed may decrease shareholders' evaluation on firm's value, and firms prefer to postpone their earnings announcement because managers think that waiting until news B is revealed may increase the shareholder's evaluation on them, and the empirical test using listed Chinese firms as sample gives strong evidences for our conclusions. The proof of proposition 1. 
, where 1>α >0，k >1.
When x is negative, U(x) is a convex and increasing function, thus the inequality holds as below:
When x is positive, U(x) is a concave and increasing function, therefore we have: We have proved before that , and we have, As we have defined in our model that the shareholders' value function is given by:
, where 1>α >0，k >1. 
Therefore, we can get a series of inequalities:
, and withal, , we find that: 
we get dX dp * >0, that is, p* is increasing in B* −A.
Q.E.D. 
<0
implies that the firm's performance is under the median performance of the whole industry.
The change of firm's market value
where MV i, t is the market value for firm i at year t, and is a proxy for firm size. 
